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ROADS NOT TAKEN: EPA VS. CLEAN WATER
BY
MICHAEL C. BLUMM∗ & WILLIAM WARNOCK∗∗

The meaning of complex statutes like the Clean Water Act is heavily
influenced by regulatory interpretations of implementing agencies like the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This Article explains three
significant cases in which EPA chose to discount the Clean Water Act’s
objective of preserving and restoring the integrity of the nation’s waters in
favor of administrative or political convenience. The result is that EPA
helped to make the statute ineffective against the nation’s major source of
water pollution: polluted runoff from nonpoint sources. This Article claims
that all these cases involved statutory gaps or ambiguities that an EPA
which took seriously the statutory objective would have interpreted
differently, and that these interpretations would have been sustained by the
courts. The authors suggest that pending a change of heart on the part of the
agency, there are several opportunities for litigants to challenge EPA’s
“roads not taken.”
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“Two roads diverged in a wood, and I–
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.”
–Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken
In some circles, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) is known as a rigorous, even single-minded enforcer of federal
environmental protection statutes.1 While that reputation seems likely to
erode in the second Bush Administration,2 in fact EPA has never been very
interested in pursuing a broad interpretation of the Clean Water Act (CWA)
that would construe some of the statute’s ambiguities to fit the scope of the
nation’s water pollution problem.3 Often, when the goal of a comprehensive

1 See, e.g., Theodore L. Garrett, Reinventing EPA Enforcement, 12 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV’T 180, 180 (1998) (“At a time when corporations are reducing emissions and improving
compliance, the government is somewhat perversely driven to bring an increasing number of
lawsuits and to collect higher fines to justify their budgets and prove that they are
performing.”); see also Christine L. Wettach, Mens Rea and the “Heightened Criminal Liability”
Imposed on Violators of the Clean Water Act, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 377, 383 (1996) (noting that
an increase in EPA’s investigative resources and its ability to seek harsher penalties have
resulted in more criminal environmental prosecutions. From 1990 through 1995, pleas and
convictions increased 70%, fines increased 80%, and jail time increased 35%. Between 1992 and
1993, the number of federal environmental criminal cases doubled); Robert W. Darnell,

Environmental Criminal Enforcement and Corporate Environmental Auditing: Time for a
Compromise?, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 123, 127 (1993) (stating that the federal government
“dramatically increased enforcement of the criminal provisions of environmental laws” in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. The “[f]ederal criminal penalties imposed between 1988 and 1992
represent ninety-four percent of all criminal penalties ever imposed under the nation’s
environmental laws.”); Kevin A. Gaynor et al., Environmental Criminal Prosecutions: Simple
Fixes for a Flawed System, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (1992) (arguing that EPA should require a
higher level of culpability in environmental enforcement); Virginia Morton Creighton,
Colorado’s Environmental Audit Privilege Statute: Striking the Appropriate Balance?, 67 U.
COLO. L. REV. 443, 444, 448 (1996) (noting that EPA enforcement of environmental laws without
providing certainty for the regulated community through an audit privilege represents overly
harsh enforcement).
2 See Press Release, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, Permit to Pollute: How the
Government’s Lax Enforcement of the Clean Water Act is Poisoning Our Waters (Aug. 6, 2002)
(reporting that nearly 30% of Clean Water Act discharges are seriously violating the terms of
their permits) available at http://uspirg.org/uspirgnewsroom.asp?id2=7545 (last visited Oct. 27,
2002); Nancy Stoner, Clean Water At Risk: A 30th Anniversary Assessment of the Bush
Administration’s Rollback of Clean Water Protections 9–24 (Oct. 2002), available at
http://www.americanrivers.org/docs/cwa30.pdf.
3 See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch (Gorsuch I), 530 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1982);
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch (Gorsuch II), 693 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n
v. Consumers Power Co. (Consumers I), 657 F. Supp. 989 (W.D. Mich. 1987); Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co. (Consumers II), 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988); Am. Wildlands v.
Browner (Am. Wildlands II), 260 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001); Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v.
Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1998).
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approach to clean water conflicted with administrative convenience or
received political wisdom, EPA compromised that goal.4
This Article discusses some landmark cases in which EPA evaded the
Clean Water Act’s fundamental objective of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing]
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”5 by
either narrowly construing the statute or acquiescing in another agency’s
narrow construction. These compromises came under Republican as well as
Democratic administrations, so crass politics does not help to explain the
results. Instead, it seems more likely that the explanation lies in a maturing
bureaucracy more interested in self-preservation than in championing the
environmental goals established in its authorizing legislation.
Our purpose here is not so much to argue that the cases we discuss
were badly decided by the reviewing courts, although we believe in some
instances they were. It does seem clear, however, that all three of the
principal cases we examine involve statutory ambiguities that, if interpreted
in light of the Clean Water Act’s objective, could have and should have been
interpreted differently by EPA. Given the deference that all the reviewing
courts in this study demonstrated to EPA interpretations that undermined
the statutory goal, we are confident that the same reviewing courts would
have sustained administrative interpretations that furthered the goal. So, in
the spirit of Professor Houck, whose project is to remind us of the
foundation cases of modern environmental law,6 we offer these case studies
as evidence that there are forks in the road, that administrative discretion
often is crucial to a statute’s life history, and that today’s Clean Water Act
has been unable to achieve the ambitious goals Congress established thirty
years ago7 in some significant part because EPA has chosen not to try.

4
5

See supra note 3 (all cases).

Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Unfinished Stories, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 867 (2002); Oliver A.
Houck, The Water, the Trees, and the Land: Three Nearly Forgotten Cases that Changed the
American Landscape, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2279 (1996).
7 EPA recently acknowledged that nonpoint source pollution is the main reason
approximately 40% of surveyed rivers, lakes, and estuaries are not clean enough to meet state
water quality goals, or to satisfy the statutory goal of swimmable, fishable waters. U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SECTION 319 SUCCESS STORIES, VOLUME III: THE
SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S SECTION 319 NONPOINT SOURCE
POLLUTION PROGRAM 1 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/Section319III/
intro.htm. In 2000, EPA reported that, of those waterbodies assessed (which totaled fewer than
half the nation’s waters), 35% of the rivers and streams and 45% of the lakes, ponds, and
reservoirs were not meeting water quality standards. In the Great Lakes (where 90% of the
shoreline miles have been assessed), 96% failed to meet the standards. According to EPA, the
leading cause of noncompliance of rivers and streams is nonpoint source runoff from
agriculture, accounting for 59% of the reported noncompliance. 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586, 43,586–87
(2000) (preamble to EPA’s 2000 water quality regulations, relying on information contained in
the National Water Quality Inventory Report to Congress for 1998).
Professor Houck, the academic expert on nonpoint source pollution, claims that
nonpoint source pollution represents the dominant water quality problem in the United States,
“dwarfing all other sources by volume, and in conventional contaminants, by far the leading
cause of nonattainment for rivers, lakes, and estuaries alike.” OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN
6
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All of the cases we analyze here concern the great divide in water
pollution law: the distinction between point and nonpoint sources. Point
sources, those “discernible, confined and discrete conveyance[s]” that
require permits for statutory compliance,8 are subject to detailed
regulation.9 Nonpoint source pollution (or polluted runoff), on the other
hand—not even specifically defined in the statute but generally understood
to include polluted runoff from farming, ranching, forestry, and land
development activities10—remains largely free of federal regulation.11 The
statute encouraged states to limit polluted runoff by offering grant money to
fund state nonpoint source control programs,12 but without federal
oversight, those programs have proved largely ineffective.13 As a result,
today nonpoint sources contribute more pollution to the nation’s waters
than point sources,14 and in the rural West, nonpoint source pollution is the
overwhelming source of water pollution.15
WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 60–61 (Envtl. L. Inst., 1999); see
also David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control: The Clean
Water Act’s Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L.J. 515, 517 (1996) (noting that
nonpoint sources account for 65–75% of the pollution in the nation’s most polluted waters and
43% of the pollution in the country’s estuaries); Cleanwater.gov, The Clean Water Action Plan,
Setting the Stage: Successes, Challenges, and New Directions (1999) (stating that most water
pollution comes from polluted runoff, and that agriculture is the most extensive source of
water pollution), at http://www.cleanwater.gov/action/c1a.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2002).
8 33 U.S.C § 1362(14) (2000). Section 301 of the statute, 33 U.S.C. § 1311, makes unlawful
the “discharge of a pollutant” without a permit. The Act defines “discharge of a pollutant” as,
inter alia, the “addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” Id. §
1362(12).
9 See, e.g., id. §§ 1311–1317 (specifying a series of effluent guidelines that must be
incorporated into point source discharge permits, called National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permits, authorized by section 402, id. § 1342, of the Act).
10 EPA defines nonpoint source pollution as “pollution caused by diffuse sources that are
not regulated as point sources and normally associated with agricultural, silvicultural and
urban runoff.” U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NONPOINT SOURCE GUIDANCE (1987),
reprinted in ENVTL. LAW INST., CLEAN WATER DESKBOOK 177 (2d ed. 1991); see also Gorsuch I,
530 F. Supp. 1291, 1305 (D.D.C. 1982) (noting EPA’s litigation position that nonpoint pollution is
“nothing more than a pollution problem not involving a discharge from a point source”).
According to Professor Rodgers, “A nonpoint source, undefined but often used in the Act,
should be understood as any source of water pollution or pollutants not associated with a
discrete conveyance. For simplicity, the universe of the causes of water pollution should be
considered as fully covered by the categories of point and nonpoint sources.” WILLIAM H.
RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 303 (2d ed. 1994).
11 See Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons From the Clean
Air Act. 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 289–90 (1999) (noting that no federal authority can design,
implement, or enforce nonpoint source regulation, except on federal lands).
12 33 U.S.C §§ 1288(f), 1319.
13 See Adler, supra note 11, at 293 (noting that nonpoint pollution remains the most
intractable Clean Water Act problem); Robert W. Adler, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water
Pollution: Is Help on the Way (From the Courts or EPA)?, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst. 2001)
10,270, 10,270 n.2 (citing U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY
INVENTORY: 1998 REPORT TO CONGRESS 62, 88, 119 (EPA 841- R-00-001, June 2000) (EPA
reporting that nonpoint source pollution contributes more pollution than any other source to
river, lake, estuary, and coastal pollution)); see also supra note 7.
14 See supra note 13 (all sources).
15 Irrigated farmland accounts for 89% of the quality-impaired river miles in the West.
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In the cases we discuss, EPA chose to 1) construe narrowly the scope
of point sources to eliminate dam-caused pollution from effective
regulation,16 2) acquiesce in the Forest Service’s position that federal
nonpoint source pollution was exempt from state water quality
certification,17 and 3) allow a state to exempt most nonpoint source
pollution from antidegradation requirements.18 In each case, circuit courts
of appeal sustained the government’s choice of the unregulated option.
However, as our analysis shows, there was sufficient ambiguity in the
statute—and sufficient adverse water quality effects—that, had the agency
taken seriously the statutory goal, the regulated option, in all probability,
would have been sustained by the courts. Our hope is that one day
Congress, or an EPA seriously concerned about clean water, will reconsider
these issues and reverse the results of these cases. In the interim, we think
some of the assumptions underlying the cases should not go unchallenged,
at least in circuits outside of those that decided them.
I. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION V. GORSUCH : EXEMPTING DAMS
FROM PERMIT REQUIREMENTS
In 1978, the largest fish kill in Missouri history occurred on the Osage
River below the Harry S. Truman Dam, when more than 400,000 fish died of
gas bubble disease because of supersaturated gas caused by uncontrolled
spills over the unfinished dam.19 The next year 100,000 fish died from the
same cause. The experience induced the state of Missouri to intervene in a
Clean Water Act suit filed by the National Wildlife Federation, which sought
to control changes in water quality resulting from dam operations.20 The
Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Thinking About Environmentally Sustainable Development in the
American West, 18 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 123, 128 (1998) (citing NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, A NEW ERA FOR IRRIGATION 73 (1996)).
16 See infra Part I.
17 See infra Part II.
18 See infra Part III.
19 The facts in this paragraph are from the district court’s opinion, Gorsuch I, 530 F. Supp.
1291, 1295–1303 (D.D.C. 1982), which contains a thorough discussion of dam-induced water
quality problems.
20 Earlier, the South Carolina Wildlife Federation and several other environmental groups
had sued the United States Army Corps of Engineers and EPA concerning the construction and
operation of the Richard B. Russell Dam on the Savannah River, which flows along the border
of Georgia and South Carolina. S. C. Wildlife Fed’n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 120–21
(D.S.C. 1978). The environmental groups claimed that the construction and operation of the
dam required a Clean Water Act permit because the construction would lower dissolved
oxygen and increase dissolved minerals in the river. Id. (Actually, the environmentalists also
claimed that the operation of two other already-constructed dams on the Savannah River also
required permits, but the district court dismissed these claims on the ground that the plaintiffs’
60-day notice of intent to sue, a jurisdictional prerequisite under the Clean Water Act, did not
include those dams. Id. at 123–24.) The court denied the government’s motion to dismiss,
because it agreed with the environmental plaintiffs that the dam’s transformation of the river’s
water quality amounted to a “discharge of a pollutant” by adding pollutants. Id. at 125–26. See
supra note 8, infra notes 24–27 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory definition of
“discharge of a pollutant”). The key to this conclusion was the court’s observation that the
functional effect of a hydroelectric facility on water quality was not materially different from

84

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 33:79

Wildlife Federation had petitioned EPA to establish an effluent guideline to
control water quality problems dams caused to waters downstream, such as
oxygen depletion (which in turn allows the release of dissolved metals like
iron and manganese from reservoir sediments), temperature changes (which
could be hot or cold depending on dam operations), sediment disruption
impairing water quality, and gas supersaturation.21 EPA refused, and the
Wildlife Federation, joined by the state of Missouri, filed suit seeking a
judicial declaration that these dam-induced water-quality changes should be
subject to NPDES permit requirements.22
Dams must discharge a pollutant into a navigable water from a point
source in order to be subject to Clean Water Act permit requirements.23
There is little question that dams are point sources, and they usually are
situated on navigable waters, as defined by the statute.24 The issue was
whether dams discharged pollutants.25 The Act defines “discharge of a
pollutant” to require “any addition of any pollutant,”26 and it defines
“pollutant” with a list that does not include most kinds of pollutants
produced by dams.27 Thus the critical question was: Did dams add pollutants
that were unmentioned by the statute?

A. The District Court Decision
Judge Joyce Hens Green of the District Court of District of Columbia
agreed with the plaintiffs that the CWA required permits for the water

other production processes producing chemical wastes and steam electric plants producing
heat. S. C. Wildlife Fed’n, 457 F. Supp. at 125. Thus, the dam’s release of water whose quality
was changed while in the reservoir constituted, according to the court, an “addition of a
pollutant” within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 126.
21 Dam-produced water pollution continues to be a major water quality problem. Dams
alter stream temperatures and sediment flows and produce water that is low in dissolved
oxygen and high in dissolved metals. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE
SPECIFYING MANAGEMENT MEASURES FOR SOURCES OF NONPOINT POLLUTION CONTROL IN COASTAL
WATERS (1993), available at http://www.epa.gov.OWOW/NPS/MMGI/Chapter6/index.html. For
example, the Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River lowered water temperatures to such an
extent that native fish cannot successfully reproduce within 240 miles downstream of the dam.
PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS: THE ECOLOGY AND POLITICS OF LARGE DAMS 36 (1996). In
the Columbia Basin, where a series of hydroelectric dams have been the major reason why a
river system that once supported 10–16 million adult salmon annually now can support roughly
10% of that, the vast majority of which are produced in hatcheries, water quality standards are
regularly violated in the Columbia’s principal tributary, the Snake. Id. at 41–42; MICHAEL C.
BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY OF THE DECLINE OF COLUMBIA
BASIN SALMON 87–108 (dam-building in Columbia Basin), 219–32 (water quality problems
caused by dams) (2002) (www.salmonlaw.net). On the Lower Snake River dams’ violation of
the Clean Water Act, see infra note 91.
22 Gorsuch I, 530 F. Supp. at 1295.
23 Gorsuch II, 693 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
24 See id. (“The parties agree that a dam can, in some circumstance be a ‘point source,’ and
that both the reservoir and the downstream river are ‘navigable waters’ within the statutory
meaning whether or not they are navigable in fact.”).
25 Id. at 165.
26 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000).
27 Id. § 1362(6). An exception is “heat,” which dams can produce.
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pollution caused by dams.28 She observed that nothing in the statute or its
legislative history indicates that dam-related pollution is to be regulated by
the federal permit program, but “in view of the broadly remedial purpose of
the Act, ‘to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters,’” she concluded that “it would disserve
those mandates to give the Act a constricted reading.”29 She noted that
several courts had concluded that activities other than those specifically
identified in the legislative history, like overflows from mining operations,
silvacultural and agricultural operations, storm sewers, and runoff from
construction sites,30 were subject to permit requirements, and she
determined that “[t]he NPDES program was intended to be
comprehensive.”31 Relying on legislative history from the Senate’s
consideration of the bill, Judge Green concluded that “the NPDES system is
the preferred method of control, and it appears that Congress would have
put all pollution sources under that program had it been feasible.”32
EPA maintained that none of the dam-induced pollution involved an
“addition” of pollutants necessary to fall within the statutory definition of
pollutant because the pollutants were already in the water, or in the case of
oxygen-depleted water and cold temperatures, involve depletions, not
additions.33 The plaintiffs countered that the term “addition” should be
construed as “creation,” and that none of these conditions would have
existed without the dams. The court agreed with the plaintiffs because it
found EPA’s “overly literal and technical” interpretation to be “more
tortured” and less consonant with the goal of the statute.34 Judge Green also
called attention to the fact that in other contexts EPA had construed the
term “pollutant” broadly, so as not to limit the term to those specifically
identified in the statute.35 Thus, she ascertained that the list of pollutants in
the statute was not exclusive.36 Although the court recognized that the term
“pollutant” was narrower than the term “pollution,” she concluded that

28
29
30

Gorsuch I, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 1303–07 (D.D.C. 1982).
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1304 (citing United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979)

(mining); Sierra Club v. Abston Construction Co., 620 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1980) (coal mine);
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (silvacultural and
agricultural operations, animal feedlots, storm sewers); Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545
F.2d 1351, 1373–74 (4th Cir. 1976) (construction site runoff)).
31 Gorsuch I, 530 F. Supp. at 1304. Judge Green observed that “‘the [CWA] must be given a
reasonable interpretation, not parsed and dissected with the meticulous technicality applied in
testing a common law indictment or a deed creating an estate in fee tail.’” (quoting Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 564 F.2d 573, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
32 Id.
33 See id. at 1306.
34 Id. at 1307.
35 Id. at 1309–10 (noting that EPA used pollutant indicators like total suspended solids and
biological oxygen demand in setting effluent guidelines, even though they were not among the
list of pollutants identified in section 502(6) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6)). Also, EPA
acknowledged that sediments and metals, although not listed in the statute, could be pollutants
under the Act. Id. at 1310.
36 Id. at 1311.
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oxygen depletion, temperature changes, sediment releases, and gas
supersaturation caused by dams were subject to permit requirements.37
Judge Green was “not unmindful” of the deference a court owes an
agency when interpreting its governing statutes, but she determined that
“[t]he statutory interpretation involved here does not require scientific
expertise” and observed that EPA’s interpretation “runs counter to
expressed congressional intent, and is inconsistent with its own
implementation of the Act in other contexts.”38 She found EPA’s
interpretation “overly technical” and inconsistent with a proper reading of
“broadly remedial legislation.”39 Moreover, EPA gave “absolutely no
reasonable basis, consistent with the purpose and policies of the Act, why
dams should not be regulated as point sources.”40 EPA simply decided it was
unable to regulate dams as point sources because the agency didn’t want to
add up to two million new point sources, including fifty to sixty thousand
large dams,41 to its regulatory burden. In addition, many, perhaps most, large
dams are federal dams operated by the United States Army Corps of
Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, powerful agencies with which
EPA did not wish to engage in further interagency turf wars.42 There was no
water quality improvement reason for EPA’s position. Despite EPA’s
attempt to relegate dams to haphazard state nonpoint source control
programs, Judge Green ordered the agency to designate dams as point
sources subject to NPDES regulation.43

B. The D.C. Circuit Opinion
EPA, joined by no fewer than thirty-four public and private utilities and
several trade associations, appealed the district court decision, and a panel
of the D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Patricia Wald, reversed.44 The
appellate court did not disagree with Judge Green’s interpretation of the
statute; instead, it ruled that she failed to give the agency proper
deference.45 After an extensive search for legislative purpose, the court
could find no clear congressional intent concerning whether dam-induced
pollution should be subjected to permit requirements.46 Anticipating the
Supreme Court’s imminent decision in the now-famous Chevron case,47 the
37
38
39
40
41

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1311–12.
Id. at 1311.
See id. at 1313. The parties defined large dams as those 25 feet or more in height, with

more than 15 acre-feet of storage capacity, or at least six feet in height, with a storage capacity
of more than 50 acre-feet. Id. at 1313 n.78.
42 This is Professor Blumm’s recollection from several agency meetings he attended while
an attorney for EPA.
43 Gorsuch I, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 1314 (D.D.C. 1982).
44 Gorsuch II, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
45 Id. at 166.
46 Id. at 171–82.
47 Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council (Chevron), 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (holding
that if a statute is silent or ambiguous on a specific issue, and the agency’s interpretation is
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court ruled that EPA’s interpretation was due more deference than Judge
Green had given it—even though the agency was unable to give a reason for
its position that was consistent with the purpose of the statute.
Although the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that “[t]he agency advanced
no policy arguments” before the district court justifying its position, Judge
Wald concluded that EPA was entitled to great deference. The court held
that EPA’s interpretation that dams were not subject to permit requirements
was a contemporaneous construction of the statute that the agency had
consistently maintained despite two internal reviews of the issue.48 The
court concluded that as long as it did not conflict with the statute or
frustrate congressional policy, EPA’s interpretation must be upheld if it was
“sufficiently reasonable,” even if it was not “the only reasonable one or even
the reading the court would have reached” on its own.49 After reviewing the
statute and legislative history, the court upheld EPA’s distinction between
the terms “pollutant” and “pollution” under which “pollutant” was narrower
than “pollution,” so that dam-induced pollution was not necessarily subject
to permit requirements.50 Thus, EPA’s conclusion that low-dissolved oxygen,
cold, and gas supersaturation were not pollutants was not “manifestly
unreasonable.”51

based on a reasonable construction of the statute, a court must defer to the agency’s
interpretation). Note, however, that unlike Chevron, Gorsuch did not involve an EPA
rulemaking. See infra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
48 Gorsuch II, 693 F.2d at 169–70. The court noted that “[t]he usual factors . . . (regulatory
agency, consistency, contemporaneous construction, expertise, congressional acquiescence,
thoroughness) generally support giving great deference to EPA’s interpretation.” Id. at 169. EPA
originally determined that dams would not be subject to permit requirements in a 1973 letter
which, the court observed, contained little legal or policy analysis. Id. at 169. The agency
reconsidered its position in 1974 and 1978, but chose to adhere to its earlier interpretation. The
court concluded that “[t]his reconsideration is sufficient evidence of thoroughness to meet the
standard for deference.” Id. Although the court stated that these “internal reconsiderations did
give primary emphasis to the policy implications of the point source-nonpoint source
distinction,” it did not identify the policies the agency considered, nor whether they were
consistent with the purpose of the Clean Water Act. Id. at 170. And, while the court announced
that “construction of the Act is likely to require scientific and technical expertise,” it did not
discuss how or why EPA’s position involved either. Id. at 167. Finally, the court admitted that it
was not clear that Congress was aware of EPA’s interpretation when Congress amended the
statute in 1977, so only “modest weight” was given to this factor. Id. at 167.
49 Id. at 171 (quoting FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 38, 39
(1981)).
50 Id. at 172–73. The court noted that the Supreme Court, in Train v. Colorado PIRG, 426
U.S. 1 (1976), ruled that “certain radioactive materials are not ‘pollutants,’ although they
undoubtedly emit pollution.” Id. at 172. Moreover, the presumption is that when Congress uses
two different terms, it intends them to mean different things, especially when it defines them
differently. Id. Further, EPA justified its distinction between “pollutant” and “pollution” on the
ground that Congress intended to limit the permit system to well-recognized pollutants. Id. The
court also pointed to statements in the legislative history indicating that the term “pollutant”
was meant to be less inclusive than the term “pollution,” the conference committee’s change in
the definition of “pollutant” to eliminate inclusive phrases such as “but is not limited to” and
“other waste,” and congressional intent that EPA should have discretion to make distinctions
between point and nonpoint sources. Id. at 172–74.
51 Id. at 174.
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Concerning the crucial definition of what constitutes an addition of a
pollutant (and is thus subject to permit requirements), the court concluded
that whether or not dams add pollutants was unclear: The “language of the
statute permits either construction.”52 Moreover, the legislative history did
not address whether dam-caused pollution should be subject to permit
requirements.53 The court determined that because Congress indicated that
EPA should have discretion in defining what constitutes point sources and
pollutants, it likely would have intended the agency to have similar
discretion to define the term “addition.”54 Therefore, the court upheld EPA’s
interpretation that a point source must “itself physically introduce[] a
pollutant into the water from the outside world.”55
In the years since the D.C. Circuit decided Gorsuch, however, EPA has
argued for—and the courts have upheld—a broad interpretation of the
meaning of “addition,” particularly in the context of wetland fills.56 It is true

52 Id. at 175. The court pointed to section 102(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b), which
states the policy of Congress “to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities
and rights of the States” to plan the development and use of land and water resources as “an
indication that Congress did not want to interfere any more than necessary with state water
management, of which dams are an important component.” Id. Leaving to states the authority
to control dam pollution would, the court thought, “reduce federal-state friction and would
permit states to develop integrated water management plans that address both [water] quality
and quantity.” Id. at 178–79. This wishful thinking on the part of the D.C. Circuit has proved to
be just that: If there are any such integrated state plans in the West, Professor Blumm, who
served as co-director of the Northwest Water Law and Policy Project for seven years, is
unaware of them.
53 Id. at 175.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 174–75. Professor Rodgers wryly commented: “On this reading, it would appear that
a source discharging pollutants drawn from its intake waters would be functionally
indistinguishable from the municipal sewage treatment plants that are routinely held
accountable for toxics slipped into their effluent by uninvited and unwelcome suppliers.”
RODGERS, supra note 10, at 439.
56 See, e.g., Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 923–25 (5th Cir. 1983)
(redeposit of trees and vegetation dug up during land clearing is an “addition”); Rybacheck v.
EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1990) (dirt and gravel excavated from a streambed for placer
mining, then returned to the stream, is an “addition”); United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331,
336–37 (4th Cir. 2000) (sidecasting dirt from digging in a wetland is an “addition”); Borden
Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted 122
S.Ct. 2355 (2002) (“deep ripping”—using bulldozers to plow up a wetland—to create vineyards
and orchards is an “addition”). In the Deaton decision, the 4th Circuit commented:

[T]he [Clean Water Act] does not prohibit the addition of material; it prohibits the
“addition of any pollutant.” The idea that there could be an addition of a pollutant
without an addition of material seems entirely unremarkable, at least when an activity
transforms some material from a nonpollutant into a pollutant, as occurred here . . . . It
is of no consequence that what is not dredged spoil was previously present on the same
property in the less threatening form of dirt and vegetation in an undisturbed state. What
is important is that once that material was excavated from the wetland, its redeposit in
that same wetland added a pollutant where none had been before.
Deaton, 209 F.3d at 335. Moreover, in the 2001 final rule revising the definition of “discharge of
dredged material,” EPA and the United States Army Corps of Engineers stated: “The Corps and
EPA regard the use of mechanized earth-moving equipment to conduct landclearing, ditching,
channelization, in-stream mining or other earth-moving activity in waters of the United States
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that wetland fills are governed by section 404 permits,57 not NPDES permits,
but both permit programs regulate “discharges,”58 which, as noted above,59
require additions. Construing the term narrowly in the NPDES context and
broadly in the wetland fill context seems inconsistent and an unlikely
candidate for judicial deference.
The court also rejected the argument that EPA’s exclusion of dam
pollution from permit requirements would undermine the primary role
Congress intended the permit program to play in the legislative scheme. The
district court had ruled that Congress intended to subject all pollution to
permit requirements where feasible to do so.60 However, the appellate court
disagreed, even though another panel of the D.C. Circuit and the Tenth
Circuit had suggested earlier that the permit program was crucial to
achieving the Act’s goals and should be interpreted to apply expansively.61
Although it cited legislative history indicating the permit program was “the
best available mechanism to control water pollution,”62 the court thought
that if Congress had decided to apply the permit program wherever feasible,
it would have done so in “suitable language.”63 The court also noted that the
legislative history indicated Congress’s intent to leave some kinds of
pollution control to the states, a view that led to an exemption for irrigation
return flows from permit requirements added in the 1977 amendments.64
Consequently, the court concluded that despite “the admittedly important
place of the NPDES permit program in the Clean Water Act,” EPA’s
exclusion of dam-caused pollution was not unreasonable.65

as resulting in a discharge of dredged material unless project-specific evidence shows that the
activity results in only incidental fallback.” 66 Fed. Reg. 4450, 4575 (Jan. 17, 2001) (codified at
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(2)(i) (2001) (Corps regulations), 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(2)(i) (2001) (EPA
guidelines). After delaying the effective date of the rule on January 24, 2001, the Bush
Administration let it go into effect on April 17, 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 10,367 (Feb. 15, 2001). See
generally William S. Pufko, The Revised Definition of “Discharge of Dredged Material:” Its
Legality, Practicality, and Impact on Wetlands Protection, 9 ENVTL. LAW. 187 (2002).
57 See, e.g., William Funk, Wetlands, in ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICE GUIDE, ch. 19 (2002);
Michael C. Blumm, The Clinton Wetlands Plan: No Net Gain in Wetlands Protection, 9 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 203 (1994).
58 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000) (“[T]he Administrator may, after opportunity for public
hearing issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant.”); 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (“The Secretary
may issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged
or fill material.”).
59 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
60 Gorsuch I, 530 F. Supp. 1291, 1304 (D.D.C. 1982).
61 Gorsuch II, 693 F.2d 126, 175 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.
v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (NPDES program “is central to the enforcement
of the [Act]”) and United States v. Earth Sci., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979) (“Congress
would have regulated so-called nonpoint sources if a workable method could have been
derived.”)) (quotations omitted).
62 Gorsuch II, 693 F.2d at 176 (citing S. REP. NO. 92-414 at 8, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3675 (internal quotations omitted)).
63 Id. (suggesting that Congress could have done so by indicating that the permit program
would govern “all pollution released through a point source,” instead of being limited to the
“addition” of pollutants from point sources).
64 Id.
65 Id. at 176–77.
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Finally, the court considered whether the exclusion of dam-caused
pollution from the permit program frustrated the purpose of the statute—to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
nation’s waters.66 To achieve this purpose, the Act established goals of
eliminating the discharge of pollutants by 1985; achieving fishable and
swimmable waters by 1983, wherever attainable; and prohibiting the
discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts.67 The D.C. Circuit felt the
district court relied too heavily on what it termed a “grand goal,”
overlooking congressional “practical recognition of the economic,
technological, and political limits on total elimination of all pollution from
all sources.”68 The court said this goal—which it observed was
unenforceable—did not necessarily require that it (or EPA) broadly
construe the term “pollutant” or interfere with state water management, “of
which dams are an important component.”69 Thus, according to the court,
“while Congress wanted to eliminate pollution if practicable, it realized that
it might have to settle for something less.”70 In short, while the court
determined that there was “no sure answer” to the question of whether
Congress intended dams to be subject to permit requirements, deference
was due to EPA’s position because of the agency’s contemporaneous
interpretation and its “expert evaluation of the seriousness of the problem,
the cost of cure, and the effectiveness of state regulation.”71 The court
concluded by emphasizing the narrow nature of its decision, stating that
[i]t is not our function to decide whether EPA’s interpretation . . . is the best
one or even whether it is more reasonable than the Wildlife Federation’s
interpretation. We hold merely that EPA’s interpretation is reasonable, not

66

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).

67

Id. § 1251(a)(1)–(3).
Gorsuch II, 693 F.2d 126, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Id. at 178. Given the congressional policy of minimizing federal control over state

68
69

decisions concerning water allocation, expressed in a 1977 amendment (33 U.S.C. § 1251(g)),
the court thought that, had Congress specifically considered dam-caused pollution, it might
have decided to leave control over dams to the states, allowing the states to develop integrated
plans addressing both water quality and quantity. Id. at 179. No such plans have ensued in the
more than two decades since the court’s decision.
70 Id. at 181. In support of this conclusion, the court cited the 1977 amendments’
replacement of “best available technology” for nontoxic pollutants with the more cost-sensitive
“best conventional pollutant control technology.” Id.
71 Id. at 181–82. However, there is nothing in either the district or appellate court opinions
to indicate that EPA systematically considered the severity of dam-induced pollution, the cost
of regulating it, or the effectiveness of state controls. The D.C. Circuit did not think it was
impractical to regulate dams, discounting EPA’s claim that it would require two million permits
and suggesting that most of the problem could be effectively confronted if the 3000 large dams
producing hydropower were regulated. Id. at 182. The court did note that dam pollution is
unique because its severity is partly a function of upstream pollutant sources and is highly sitespecific, making promulgation of a generic “best available technology” regulation standard
difficult. Id.
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inconsistent with congressional intent, and entitled to great deference;
therefore, it must be upheld.72

C. The Consumers Power Case
The D.C. Circuit opinion in Gorsuch II was followed two years later by
the Supreme Court’s well-known Chevron decision, in which the Court ruled
that where a statute is silent or ambiguous, a reviewing court must defer to
the administering agency’s reasonable interpretations of the statute.73
Chevron basically ratified the D.C. Circuit’s approach to agency deference in
Gorsuch. Then, six years after Gorsuch, the Sixth Circuit relied on both
Chevron and Gorsuch to exempt from permit requirements a hydroelectric
pumped storage plant that released dead fish and fish remains into Lake
Michigan.74
The district court had ruled that these releases constituted an addition
of a pollutant, not merely by conveying polluted water to another water
body, but by physically removing water with live fish, holding the water, and
then discharging it back into the lake with dead fish and fish remains
added.75 A divided Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court had
failed to give EPA’s interpretation of the term “addition” the proper
deference but had instead interpreted the term “in accordance with its own
vision of the Act.”76 The appeals court rejected the distinction the district
court had drawn between the D.C. Circuit’s consideration of changes in
water “conditions” and the pumped storage facility at issue which produced
“substances.” The Sixth Circuit determined that “such a distinction is
irrelevant under the statute.”77 Thus, although a permit would be required
for a fish-packing plant to dump thousands of pounds of fish into the lake,
no permit is required for an adjacent hydroelectric plant that not only
dumps the dead fish, but also kills them. Professor Rodgers’s treatise found
it curious that such “functionally equivalent deed[s]” should be treated so
differently.78 Thus, like the D.C. Circuit, the Sixth Circuit allowed EPA

72

Id. at 183. Professor Rodgers was unconvinced by the court’s decision:

Dams look very much like point sources—with single structures, observable effects,
modifiable behavior. Nationwide, there are approximately 5500 power generating dams
that would be considered the major sources . . . . Empirically, serious nitrogen
supersaturation problems on the Columbia River were relieved only after years of
operational adjustments at the individual federal dams on the river, suggesting problems
suitable for individualized permit treatment. By contrast, the state experimentation with
pollution control at dams, recommended by the jurisdictional allocation theory, is not in
evidence.
RODGERS, supra note 10, at 316.
73 Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
74 Consumers II, 862 F.2d 580, 584–86 (6th Cir. 1988).
75 Consumers I, 657 F. Supp. 989, 1005–09 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
76 Consumers II, 862 F.2d at 585.
77 Id. at 586. The dissent agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the pumped storage
facility “added” a “pollutant” in the process of discharging dead fish and fish remains. Id. at 590
(Jones, J., dissenting).
78 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 4.10 (1986); see also
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effectively to exempt dam-caused pollution from Clean Water Act permit
requirements. The issue seemed settled.

D. The Catskill Mountains Case
The exemption of dam pollution from permit requirements remained
unchallenged for some time. Then, in 1998, a coalition of environmental
groups concerned about the water quality of Esopus Creek, a Hudson River
tributary and world-class trout stream, challenged a water transfer to the
creek from Schoharie Reservoir through the Shandaken Tunnel. This
interbasin transfer to the creek and eventually to another reservoir helps
provide New York City with drinking water. However, the diversion also
produces suspended solids, turbidity, and temperature increases in the
creek from the introduction of fine, red-clay sediments.79 In Catskill
Mountains, the plaintiffs claimed this water transfer amounted to an
addition of pollutants, and therefore required an NPDES permit.80 The
district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ suit, but a unanimous Second Circuit
reversed.81
Chief Judge John Walker’s opinion agreed with the plaintiffs that the
lower court gave unjustified deference to EPA’s position. EPA, of course,
maintained that dam-produced pollution is exempt from permit
requirements.82 The court noted that recent Supreme Court decisions have
indicated that while Chevron deference governs in a rulemaking or other
formal proceeding, that sort of broad deference is not appropriate in a case
like this one, in which EPA’s position is grounded on a series of informal
policy statements and litigation positions.83 Instead, such a position is
“‘entitled to respect’ . . . but only to the extent that those interpretations
have the ‘power to persuade.’”84 Litigation positions, according to Chief
Judge Walker, lack “the indicia of expertise, regularity, rigorous
consideration, and public scrutiny that justify Chevron deference.”85 Thus,

RODGERS, supra note 10, at 314 n.74:
There is a plausible if not compelling textual case for the coverage of dams by the “point
source” provisions. They certainly cause “pollution,” as the term is defined, and appear
to be responsible for “pollutants” if attention is paid to the historical breadth of the term.
They even could be said to bring about some of their polluting potential by “adding”
beds to the stream if a physical showing is required, which is doubtful since waste “heat”
alone clearly passes muster as a “pollutant.”

Id.
79 See Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. City of New York (Catskill
Mountains), 273 F.3d 481, 485 (2d Cir. 2001).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 494.
82 Id. at 489.
83 Id. at 490 (relying on United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) and Christensen v.

Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000)).
84 Id. at 491 (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587).
85 Id.
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the court concluded that EPA’s position on the dam exemption from permit
requirements should be followed “to the extent persuasive.”86
The Second Circuit acknowledged that EPA’s definition of an addition
of a pollutant necessary to trigger permit requirements—an introduction of
a pollutant from the outside world—was a “plain meaning” interpretation of
the term.87 But it hardly seemed to find the agency’s position to be
“persuasive.”88 The court distinguished the facts of the Esopus Creek
situation from the typical dam situation and even the Lake Michigan
pumped storage facility. In this case, water was diverted from one water
body through a tunnel to a completely different water body. The passing of
suspended sediments through the tunnel and into Esopus Creek therefore
amounted to an addition of a pollutant, in the court’s judgment.89 Thus, the
diversion required an NPDES permit.
By emphasizing the peculiar facts of Catskill Mountains, the Second
Circuit left intact EPA’s position that dam-induced pollution is not generally
subject to permit requirements.90 Under the court’s opinion, EPA’s
interpretation must now be persuasive, not merely reasonable, and it is not
clear that the D.C. and Sixth Circuits would have found the agency’s
position persuasive. Of course, EPA could choose to promulgate its position
on dams as a rule, thereby reviving Chevron deference and allowing the
serious water quality problems dams cause to continue to escape Clean
Water Act permit requirements.91 If it does not, the door is open to
86
87
88
89
90

Id. (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 235).
Id. at 492.
Id.
Id.
However, the effect of Catskill Mountains could be quite significant. For example, in the

Ninth Circuit, where irrigation canals are “waters of the United States” subject to Clean Water
Act jurisdiction (Headwaters v. Talent Irrigation, 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001)), the Second
Circuit’s conclusion that there is an “addition of a pollutant” where there are adverse water
quality effects from a transfer from one water body to another could lead to new permit
requirements for irrigation ditches. Mark Morford, Stoel Rives law firm, Remarks at The Clean
Water Act Turns 30: Celebrating Its Past, Predicting Its Future (Lewis & Clark Law School, Oct.
17, 2002); see also the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v.
S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2002), where the court held that flood control
operations pumping water with high levels of phosphorus from a canal into a water
conservation area added pollutants, requiring a Clean Water Act permit. The court ruled:
When a point source changes the natural flow of a body of water which contains
pollutants and causes that water to flow into another distinct body of navigable water
into which it would not have otherwise flowed, that point source is the cause-in-fact of
the discharge of pollutants. And, because the pollutants would not have entered the
second body of water but for the change in flow caused by the point source, an addition
of pollutants from a point source occurs.
Id. at 1368–69 (emphasis in original).
91 Dams are not completely beyond Clean Water Act regulation, however. Where federal
dams produce violations of state water quality standards, they are subject to section 313’s
directive that they comply with applicable federal, state, or local pollution control
requirements, even if they produce only nonpoint source pollution. See 33 U.S.C. § 1323
(applying to all federal activities resulting in the discharge or runoff of pollutants); Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (D. Or. 2000), where the district
court ruled that section 313 required the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to operate its four dams
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environmental plaintiffs to argue that EPA’s position exempting dam
pollution from permit requirements is not persuasive, and therefore merits
no deference.
II. OREGON NATURAL DESERT ASSOCIATION V. DOMBECK : LEGITIMIZING
COWS IN THE CREEK
In July 1993, the United States Forest Service issued a grazing permit to
Robert and Diana Burril, enabling them to graze fifty head of cattle on
federal lands in the Malheur National Forest in eastern Oregon. The
permitted area, known as the Camp Creek allotment, straddled the Middle
Fork of the John Day River, an important salmon spawning stream.92 The
grazing polluted both the river and the creek with animal waste,
sedimentation, and increased water temperatures. Cattle grazing in and
around streams is a problem of considerable dimension across the rural
West.93

on the Lower Snake River to meet state water quality standards. Subsequently, the court
determined that a Corps’ operating plan for the dams satisfied section 313. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n
v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 99-CV-442-FR (D. Or. Jan 9, 2003). As of this writing, an appeal of
this decision to the Ninth Circuit appeared likely. See also Robin Kundis Craig, Idaho Sporting
Congress v. Thomas and Sovereign Immunity: Federal Facility Nonpoint Sources, the APA, and
the Meaning of “In the Same Manner and to the Same Extent as Any Nongovernmental Entity,”
30 ENVTL. L. 527, 537 (2000) (noting that section 313 requires compliance by federal facilities
only if the state also requires nonfederal nonpoint sources to comply with state water quality
standards). However, in the case of dams, nonfederal hydropower dams licensed by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–825 (2000),
must obtain state water quality certification under section 401(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). See Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower
Czar and the Rise of Agency Pluralism in Hydroelectric Licensing, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81, 96–
108 (2001) (discussing the requirement that FERC-licensed dams must obtain Section 401 state
water quality certification). Thus, under the “equal protection” promise of section 313, federal
dams should be required to meet water quality standards as well.
92 The John Day is the only river in the Upper Columbia Basin where salmon
spawnswithout dams and without hatcheries. To reach the John Day, salmon must pass two
Corps of Engineers dams on the mainstem Columbia.
93 For example, as Professor Houck reports:
Cattle grazing has long been recognized as a primary source of pollution in western
waters, which tend to be scarce to begin with and lack the volume to flush, mix, and
biodegrade, and otherwise accommodate the loads of oxygen demand and sediments
input directly from livestock manure and indirectly from destabilized riparian zones.
There are 2 million livestock across the West today, and there have been as many as 20
million at times in this century. They congregate at, on, and in any water source at hand.
An adult cow produces more than 80 pounds of manure per day, nearly 16 tons per year.
In all bovine innocence, they trample streambanks into mudslides and pound their
watering holes into so-called sacrifice areas and water gaps. With the loss of vegetation
comes the loss of shade, the onset of thermal pollution and serious algal bloom.
Overgrazing, even on lands miles distant from western watercourses, leads to
accelerated runoff from period storms, further degrading water quality.
HOUCK, supra note 7, at 95.
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In 1994, eight environmental organizations, headed by the Oregon
Natural Desert Association (ONDA), filed suit,94 alleging that the Forest
Service violated the Clean Water Act by issuing the federal grazing permit
without obtaining a water quality certification from the state of Oregon
stating that the permit would not lead to a violation of the state’s water
quality standards. Section 401 of the Act requires applicants for federal
licenses or permits that may result in discharges into navigable waters to
obtain state water quality certification.95 The Confederated Tribes of the
Warm Springs Indian Reservation, which have treaty fishing rights in the
John Day River Basin,96 intervened in support of ONDA. Robert Burril, Grant
County, and the Eastern Oregon Land Coalition intervened on the side of the
Forest Service. EPA was not involved in the suit, although the agency was
well aware of it and its implications.97 Nor was the state of Oregon involved,
although it was the state’s certification authority the environmentalists and
the Tribes were attempting to assert.98

A. The District Court Decision
District Judge Ancer Haggerty, after ruling that ONDA and the tribe had
standing,99 decided that the plaintiffs could use the citizen suit provision of
the Clean Water Act to enforce water quality certification violations.100 He
94 ONDA filed suit under the Clean Water Act’s citizen suit provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(2000), and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000). The other environmental
plaintiffs were Rest the West, the Oregon Natural Resources Council, the Oregon Wildlife
Federation, the Pacific Rivers Council, the Portland Audubon Society, the Northwest
Environmental Defense Center, and Trout Unlimited. The Oregon Natural Resources Coalition
joined in the appeal.
95 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).
96 See generally BLUMM, supra note 21, at 53–86 (discussing Pacific Northwest Indian
treaties and their judicial interpretation).
97 Fred Hansen, General Manager, Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of
Portland, Remarks at The Clean Water Act Turns 30: Celebrating Its Past, Predicting Its Future
(Lewis & Clark Law School, Oct. 17, 2002). Mr. Hansen, Deputy EPA Administrator at the time
of Dombeck, recalls arguing that the government should not have adopted the Forest Service’s
position, but the Justice Department did not agree. We maintain that EPA, expressly entrusted
by Congress with the administration of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d), bears
responsibility for allowing the Forest Service’s interpretation to become the government
interpretation put before the courts.
98 The state’s lack of interest in exercising its own authority lends support to Professor
Houck’s assertion that the state certification battle was perhaps much ado about not much,
because certification “is in many states a routine and meaningless formality.” HOUCK, supra
note 7, at 97 (suggesting that the requirements of section 313 of the statute, requiring federal
facilities to comply with state nonpoint requirements to the same extent as other nonpoint
source users (see supra note 91) would bear more fruit).
99 The court determined that ONDA had standing even though no member of the
organization lived near Camp Creek because its members recreated in the vicinity, and the
pollution from the grazing was allegedly the result of defective government procedures. Or.
Natural Desert Ass’n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534, 1538 (D. Or. 1996). The Warm Springs Tribe
satisfied the standing threshold on similar grounds. Id.
100 Id. (relying on Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1995),
for the proposition that citizen suits are appropriate to enforce either effluent or water quality
standards violations). Although the court noted that ONDA sought review under both the Clean
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phrased the issue succinctly: “The primary issue is whether the reference [in
section 401] to ‘any discharge into navigable waters’ . . . is limited to point
sources.”101 He decided that the government’s argument limiting discharge
to point sources contradicted the plain meaning of the statutory definition
of discharge, which “includes a discharge of pollutants,” which in turn is
defined as an “addition of a pollutant to navigable waters from a point
source.”102 According to Judge Haggerty, the term “includes” in the
definition of discharge “permits additional, unstated meanings,” and is
therefore not restricted to point sources.103
The Forest Service argued that its interpretation restricting section 401
certification to point sources was entitled to Chevron deference.104 The
court, however, disagreed, stating that since EPA administers the Clean
Water Act, the Forest Service was not entitled to any deference at all.105 The
court examined the legislative history of the statute, noting that section 401
originated in the 1970 amendments to the statute, when there was no
distinction between point and nonpoint sources.106 Judge Haggerty quoted
Senator Cooper who, in describing the 1970 amendments, stated that they
“require, without exception, that all Federal activities that have any effect
on water quality be conducted so that water quality standards be
maintained.”107 Because the court was convinced that the 1972 amendments,
which established the point/nonpoint source dichotomy, “were intended to
improve enforcement of pollution from point sources, not supplant the old
system,” it rejected interpreting the 1972 amendments to restrict section 401
to point sources.108 Consequently, the district court concluded that the
pollution of Camp Creek and the John Day River from the federally
permitted grazing amounted to a discharge within the meaning of section
401, necessitating a state certification that the grazing would comply with
water quality standards.109 The result offered the prospect of using the state
water quality certification process as an effective handle on water pollution
produced by federal land management activities.
Water Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (Thomas, 940 F. Supp. at 1536) it did not
address the APA claim, because it found jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act’s citizen suit
provision. Id. at 1538.
101 Id. at 1539.
102 Id. at 1539–40 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(16) (definition of “discharge”) and 33 U.S.C. §
1362(12) (definition of “discharge of a pollutant”)).
103 Id. at 1540 (citing, inter alia, Gorsuch II, 693 F.2d 156, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); see also Alia
S. Miles, Searching for the Definition of “Discharge”: Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, 28
ENVTL. L. 191, 213 (1998) (noting that of 20 definitions in section 502 of the Clean Water Act,
only in the definition of “discharge” did Congress use the word “includes,” and suggesting that
the language should be interpreted to mean “but is not limited to,” rather than “means”).
104 Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534, 1540 (D. Or. 1996).
105 Id., also noting that “a post hoc rationalization by an agency counsel, when the agency
itself has not taken a position prior to litigation, is not entitled to deference.” Id.
106 Id. at 1540–41.
107 Id. at 1541 (quoting 115 Cong. Rec. 28,970 (1969) (statement of Sen. Cooper)).
108 Id.
109 Thomas, 940 F. Supp. at 1541. See Miles, supra note 103, at 225–28 (concluding that the
district court’s opinion was supported by the language of the statute, its legislative history, and
its structure).
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B. The Ninth Circuit Decision
By reversing Judge Haggerty, the Ninth Circuit dashed hopes of
effectively controlling water pollution caused by federal land management
activities.110 The court, in an opinion by Judge Mary Schroeder (now Chief
Judge of the circuit), determined that the result hinged on the interpretation
of the word “discharge” as used in section 401.111 She concluded that “[t]he
Clean Water Act, when examined as a whole, cannot support the [district
court’s] conclusion that [section 401] applies to nonpoint sources.”112
To reach this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit examined the 1972 Clean
Water Act amendments and incorrectly interpreted the amendments’ effect.
The court reviewed the pre-1972 water pollution control scheme, noting that
it suffered from cumbersome enforcement procedures and a lack of
incentives to reduce pollution if water quality standards were being met.113
According to the court, the 1972 amendments overhauled water pollution
control by focusing on point sources and did not directly regulate nonpoint
sources.114 This is not an inaccurate summation of the thrust of the 1972
amendments, but the court seemed unaware that, as Judge Haggerty and an
earlier panel of the Ninth Circuit had recognized, the 1972 amendments did
not supplant the preexisting water quality standards scheme.115 Although
CWA-funded state nonpoint source programs are not enforceable under the
Act,116 and effluent limitations, applicable to point sources, do not apply to

110 The court upheld the district court’s determination that ONDA had standing, concluding
that its members live adjacent to the John Day River and use it for recreation and are injured by
the pollution produced by the permitted grazing. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 1998).
The court observed that by alleging a procedural injury (a lack of water quality certification),
the plaintiff’s burden of proving immediacy and redressability are reduced. Id. (relying on Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)). The appeals court did not address the
standing of the Warm Springs Tribes.
The Ninth Circuit also ruled that the suit was authorized by the Clean Water Act’s citizen
suit provision, noting that the provision authorizes any citizen to bring a suit against a federal
agency alleged to be in violation of section 401’s requirement of obtaining state water quality
certification, not just those agencies allegedly violating point source discharge limitations
imposed by state certification. Id. at 1095. The court also rejected an argument that the Clean
Water Act authorized suits only to challenge water quality certifications that had been issued.
Id.
111
112
113

Id.
Id. at 1096.
Id. “Regulators had to work backward from an overpolluted body of water and determine

which entities were responsible; proving cause and effect was not always easy . . . . [Moreover],
[t]he scheme focused on ‘the tolerable effects rather than the preventable causes’ of pollution.”
Id. (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting EPA
v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202–03 (1976))).
114

Id.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Haggerty’s ruling); see also
Northwest Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[N]owhere does Congress
evidence an intent to preclude the enforcement of water quality standards that have not been
115

translated into effluent discharge limitations . . . . [The 1972 amendments were] intended to
improve enforcement, not supplant the old system.”) (emphasis in original).
116 Nonpoint source controls may, however, be enforceable under state law. However, most
state nonpoint source programs are hortatory, vague, and unenforceable, and virtually no state
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nonpoint sources,117 the 1972 amendments left water quality standards
intact. The Ninth Circuit seemed to think that the statute called for water
quality standards to be enforceable only against point sources but, as
discussed below,118 that was an erroneous assumption.
The court appeared to acknowledge that when section 401 was enacted
in 1970, it applied to point as well as nonpoint sources.119 But Judge
Schroeder thought the effect of the 1972 amendment of section 401 to
include the term “discharge” was intended to restrict significantly the
applicability of the provision. This alteration, the Ninth Circuit maintained,
was necessary to ensure section 401’s consistency “with the bill’s changed
emphasis from water quality standards to effluent limitations based on the
elimination of any discharge of pollutants.”120 Although neither the text nor
the legislative history clearly indicates that Congress intended to restrict the
scope of state certification under section 401,121 the court maintained that
the “changed emphasis” of the 1972 amendments made water quality
standards inapplicable to nonpoint sources.122 Thus, the court declared:
“The term ‘discharge’ in [section 401] is limited to discharges from point
sources.”123 The court supported this conclusion by observing that section
401 made no mention of runoff. The court also asserted that all the other
sections of the Clean Water Act referenced in section 401 concern point
source regulation, again misinterpreting the effect of section 303’s
requirement of water quality standards.124 The court also contrasted section
401’s silence regarding runoff to section 313 of the statute, which was
amended in 1977 expressly to expand its scope, requiring federal activities
producing runoff to comply with state water quality standards.125
authorizes citizen suits against nonpoint source polluters.
117 Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Or. Natural Res. Council v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 834 F.2d 842, 850 (9th Cir. 1987) (ruling that reference to state water quality
standards in section 301(b)(1)(C) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C), applied only to point
sources)).
118 See infra notes 146–58 and accompanying text (discussing the Pronsolino decisions).
119 Prior to 1972, section 401 required certification that all federally licensed activities would
not violate state water quality standards. Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1097 (citing Pub. L. No. 91-224,
§ 21(b)(1), 84 Stat. 91 (1970)).
120 Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 414, at 69 (1971)).
121 Craig N. Johnston, 1998–The Year In Review, 29 ENVTL. L. 69, 91–94 (1999).
122 Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1097–98.
123 Id. at 1097.
124 Id. at 1097–98. Section 401 references sections 301, 302, 303, 306, and 307 of the Act. 33
U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2000). The court also rejected ONDA’s claim that the Supreme Court indicated
the Act should be interpreted more broadly because in PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology,
511 U.S. 700 (1994), the Court upheld a state water quality certification that imposed minimum
streamflows, even though those conditions did not relate to a discharge from the water project.
Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1097–98. According to the Ninth Circuit, that Supreme Court case
involved a point source (the court erroneously supposed the project at issue involved a dam—it
actually involved a water diversion into an off-stream hydroelectric facility), and therefore was
distinguishable from federal land grazing. Id.
125 Id. at 1098. Section 313 would appear to require that an issuance of a federal permit for
activities producing runoff must comply with state water quality standards if the state required
similarly situated nonfederal activities to comply with water quality standards. 33 U.S.C. §
1323(a) (2000). However, the court noted that violations of section 313 were not actionable

2003]

ROADS NOT TAKEN

99

As for the crucial definition of “discharge,” which seems to suggest
additional, unexpressed meanings through its use of the term “includes,”126
the court stated that “discharge” is broader than “discharge of pollutants”
because “it includes all releases from point sources, whether polluting or
nonpolluting.”127 The court never explained why the statute would subject
nonpolluting releases to permit requirements, although it claimed its
interpretation “comports with the structure and lexicon of the Clean Water
Act.”128 In the court’s view, that structure and lexicon clearly did not include
nonpoint sources subject to state water quality certification requirements
because the court assumed that the Clean Water Act exempted nonpoint
sources from any effective water quality controls.129 Apparently, the
structure and lexicon of the Act did not include the statute’s goals of
restoring and maintaining the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the nation’s waters and attaining fishable and swimmable water quality.130
Moreover, subsequent events have called into serious question the court’s
assumption about the regulatory exemption for nonpoint sources.

C. Pronsolino v. Nastri: Applying TMDLs to Nonpoint Sources
Under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of section 401, the Clean Water
Act contains no effective approach to control the cause of most of the water
pollution in the country. But not even EPA accepted this position.131 Water

under the Clean Water Act’s citizen suit provision. Dombeck, 172 F.3d at 1098 (citing 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(f)). The court did not mention that ONDA sought review under both the Clean Water Act
and the Administrative Procedure Act. See supra note 94.
126 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16) (2000) (“The term ‘discharge,’
when used without qualification includes a discharge of a pollutant, and a discharge of
pollutants.”).
127 Dombeck, 173 F.3d at 1098.
128 Id. at 1098 (citing Gorsuch II, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (interpreting “discharge” to
include turbid water not containing any pollutant)). The court also rejected the Warm Springs
Tribes’ argument that the cattle wading into the John Day River and defecating there are
sufficiently similar to point source discharges as to be subjected to permit requirements
because the term “point source” does not include a human being or an animal. Id. The court
also dismissed the tribes’ claim that the cattle amounted to a “concentrated animal feeding
operation” (a defined “point source”) because EPA regulations require operations of this size to
be certified by the state NPDES program director. Id. at 1099.
129 Id. at 1098.
130 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a), (a)(2) (2000). For a sophisticated analysis of other provisions of the
Clean Water Act to control federal nonpoint source pollution in the wake of Dombeck, see
Peter M. Lacy, Addressing Water Pollution from Livestock Grazing after ONDA v. Dombeck:
Legal Strategies Under the Clean Water Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 617 (2000) (examining the TMDL
program, discussed in the next section, as a long-term strategy, and section 313, requiring
federal facilities to comply with state nonpoint source requirements, as a short-term strategy to
improving water quality).
131 EPA has interpreted TMDLs to apply to nonpoint sources since 1973, when the agency’s
interim regulations required that in their water quality planning process, states would identify
“water quality segments,” waterbodies not meeting water quality standards, and establish
TMDLs for those waterbodies, “including consideration of nonpoint source contributions.”
Identifying Impaired Waterbodies and Establishing Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs), 38
Fed. Reg. 8035, 8037 (1973) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 130.24 (1973)). For water quality segments,
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quality standards, which are set by the states but subject to federal review
and oversight,132 may be violated by point or nonpoint sources, or a
combination of both. The Clean Water Act requires EPA to set water quality
standards if it finds a state’s standards inadequate.133
Section 303(d)’s establishment of total maximum daily loads (TMDLs)
for waterbodies not meeting water quality standards is a means to bring all
sources into compliance with water quality standards. TMDLs, which
represent the maximum total pollution a stream can absorb and remain in
compliance with water quality standards, can impose requirements on both
point and nonpoint sources. The Clean Water Act requires states to identify
all “in-state” or “interterritorial” waters that do not meet water quality
standards and establish TMDLs for those waters.134 EPA must promulgate
TMDLs for states that do not.135 For most of the Clean Water Act’s life, this
statutory requirement was overlooked, but it is now coming to the
forefront.136

states had to identify allocation for nonpoint sources where feasible, id. at 8037 (codified at 40
C.F.R § 130.25(b) (1973)), and “identify, evaluate, and, to the extent practicable establish
controls over nonpoint sources of pollutants.” 38 Fed. Reg. at 8037 (codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 130.29 (1973)).
EPA’s final regulations in 1974 retained the required identification of water quality
segments and the setting of TMDLs in the states’ continuing planning process, requiring states
to target allocations for nonpoint sources. Water Quality Planning and Management, 39 Fed.
Reg. 19,634, 19,641 (1974) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 131.305(a) (1974)). The purpose was to
establish controls for certain nonpoint sources, including agriculture, silvaculture, mining,
construction, salt water intrusion, and others. Id. at 19,641 (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.305–
131.306).
EPA reorganized its regulations in 1975, but continued to require states to identify
nonpoint source “control needs.” 40 Fed. Reg. 55,343, 55,345 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(f),
(g), (j) (1975)). States still had to set TMDLs for water quality segments, including a gross
allotment for nonpoint sources. Id. § 131.11(f)(3).
In 1985, EPA comprehensively revised its regulations, and those regulations remain in
effect as of this writing. The revised regulations required states to identify “water quality–
limited segments” (a nomenclature change) and set TMDLs for those segments, including “load
allocations” (another nomenclature change) for nonpoint source pollution where necessary to
meet water quality standards. 50 Fed. Reg. 1774, 1779 (1985) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.2(h),
130.7(1985)); see also infra note 137.
EPA’s latest attempt to revise its regulations in 2000, see infra note 193, was not at issue
in the Pronsolino case.
132 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d), (e) (2000).
133 Id. § 1313(b).
134 Id. § 1313(d).
135 Id. § 1313(d)(2). Professor Houck’s book explains that EPA ignored its responsibility
under section 303(d) for years—until environmentalists instituted a series of successful suits
that eventually convinced EPA to take belated action to implement the provision. HOUCK, supra
note 7, at 49–63; see also id., app. B 183–84 (chart of all TMDL-related litigation as of 1999, by
state).
136 See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs III: A New Framework for the Clean Water Act’s Ambient
Standards Program, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,415, 10,416 (1998) ; Nina Bell, TMDLs at
a Crossroads: Driven by Litigation, Derailed by Controversy?, 22 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L.
REV. 61, 62–63 (2001) (reporting that TMDL lawsuits were filed against EPA in 38 states,
resulting in 20 court orders to produce TMDLs in 18 different states); Adler, supra note 11, at
205 (noting that the citizen suits have rejuvenated the TMDL program).
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Establishing TMDLs is the first step in cleaning up streams that fail to
meet water quality standards despite the application of all pertinent
technology-based controls. The second step is determining what must be
done to meet the TMDLs for a particular stream. This may involve imposing
additional controls on point sources or requiring changed operations from
nonpoint sources.137 EPA regulations have long interpreted the setting of
TMDLs to implicate nonpoint as well as point source pollution,138 so it is
puzzling why the Dombeck court thought the statute prescribed no
regulation of nonpoint sources. True, unlike in the case of water quality
standards and TMDLs, EPA lacks authority to prescribe load allocations for
particular nonpoint sources,139 but it does require states to set them.140
Additionally, the Clean Water Act clearly requires states to take action to
implement TMDLs in order to meet water quality standards.141 These
provisions amount to a considerable federal presence in the nonpoint
pollution world.
In 1998, in response to a citizen suit,142 EPA finally used its statutory
authority to foster clean water, rather than let the states ignore the problem.
The agency established a TMDL for the Garcia River in California, a stream
affected only by nonpoint sources.143 Just as surprising, the state actually
took action to implement EPA’s directive, as the California Department of
Forestry imposed several restrictions designed to reduce soil erosion from a
timber harvest proposed by a private landowner.144 The landowner, joined
by the county, state, and national chapters of the farm bureau, challenged
EPA’s authority to promulgate the TMDL. The district court, in a lengthy and
thoughtful opinion, upheld EPA’s action, repeatedly observing that Congress
intended the Clean Water Act to result in a comprehensive system of
137 To meet water quality standards, EPA requires states to impose additional controls on
point sources through what it terms “wasteload allocations” and imposes changed operations
on nonpoint sources through “load allocations.” EPA defines a “wasteload allocation” as “[t]he
portion of a TMDL’s pollutant load allocated to a point source of a pollutant for which an
NPDES permit is required. For waterbodies impaired by both point and nonpoint sources,
wasteload allocations may reflect anticipated or expected reductions of pollutants from other
sources if those anticipated or expected reductions are supported by reasonable assurance that
they will occur.” Water Quality Planning and Management, 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(g) (2002). The
agency defines “load allocation” as “[t]he portion of a TMDL’s pollutant load allocated to a
nonpoint source, storm water source for which a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit is not required, atmospheric deposition, ground water, or background
source of pollutants.” Id. § 130.2(f).
138 See supra note 131.
139 See Adler, supra note 11.
140 Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 1998).
141 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(3)(F) (2000).
142 Pac. Coast Fed. of Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Marcus, No. 95-4474 MHP (consent decree,
March 6, 1997) (agreeing to establish a TMDL for the Garcia River and 16 other rivers that had
been recently added to the states list of impaired waters under section 303(d)(1)(A) of the
statute, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(a)).
143 See Pronsolino v. Marcus (Pronsolino I), 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339–40 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
Garcia River TMDL, (March 16, 1998), available at www.epa.gov/Region9/water/
tmdl/garcia/garcia.pdf.
144 Pronsolino I, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1138. The state thought that if it did not implement EPA’s
TMDL, EPA could withdraw the state’s pollution control money. Id. at 1340.
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pollution control to achieve the Act’s water quality goals.145 Consequently,
Judge Alsup rejected the landowner’s arguments that the TMDLs applied
only to point sources.146 Unlike the Dombeck court, the district court based
its decision heavily on the goals of the statute and congressional intent to
institute a comprehensive scheme of pollution control.
In 2002, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, in an apparent
repudiation of the Dombeck court’s assumption that nonpoint sources are
effectively immune from Clean Water Act regulation.147 The court first
decided that EPA’s regulatory interpretation of the statute was entitled to
Chevron deference because the agency was exercising delegated authority
to interpret the statute, meaning its interpretation was controlling unless
plainly erroneous.148 The opinion by Judge Berzon rejected the landowner’s
argument that EPA had not interpreted the statute consistently, and
therefore its position was not owed judicial deference. The court concluded
instead that EPA had “quite clearly” required the identification of waters
polluted only by nonpoint sources since 1973, in its first regulations
implementing the 1972 amendments.149 The fact that EPA did not “actively

145

Id. at 1341–43, 1345, 1352, 1355.
Id. at 1346–52 (construing section 303(d) of the Act, its legislative history, and Ninth
Circuit case law). The cases central to the court’s analysis were Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v.
Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Congress and the EPA have already determined that
146

establishing TMDLs is an effective tool for achieving water quality standards in waters
impacted by non-point source pollution.”); and Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Clark, 57 F.3d
1517, 1520 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A TMDL represents the cumulative total of all ‘load allocations
which are in turn best estimates of the discrete loading attributed to nonpoint sources, natural
background sources, and . . . individual point sources.”).
Judge Alsup also rejected the landowner’s argument that TMDLs are required only for
“pollutants,” a term associated with point sources. The court concluded that the Ninth Circuit
had already decided that “pollutant” included sediment, which is what the EPA TMDL sought to
reduce. Pronsolino I, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 1351 (citing Rybacheck v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1285–86
(9th Cir. 1990) and Idaho Conservation League v. Thomas, 91 F.3d 1345, 1347 (9th Cir. 1996)).
The court had more trouble with the fact that the statutory definition of “pollutant” was
something “discharged” into water, especially in light of the Dombeck court’s limitation of
“discharges” to point sources for purposes of state water quality certification. However, the
district court observed that the statute referred to nonpoint sources of pollutants with some
frequency. Id. at 1352 (citing sections 105(d), 304(e), 305(b)(1)(E), and 201(d)(2) of the Act).
The court also noted that EPA’s position about TMDLs including nonpoint sources has been
consistent, and the agency never represented that it lacked authority to issue a TMDL for
nonpoint sources. Id. at 1354 n.17. For criticism of the district court’s reasoning, see Mandi M.
Hale, Pronsolino v. Marcus, the New TMDL Regulation, and Nonpoint Source Pollution: Will the
Clean Water Act’s Murky TMDL Provision Ever Clear the Waters?, 31 ENVTL. L. 981, 995–1002
(2001) (objecting to the court’s conclusion that Congress intended to include nonpoint sources
within TMDLs, but acknowledging that defining the term “pollutant” was within EPA’s
discretion).
147 Pronsolino v. Nastri (Pronsolino II), 291 F.3d 1123, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2002).
148 Id. at 1133. The court noted that even if EPA was not entitled to Chevron deference, the
agency was still owed substantial deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944), because EPA was interpreting “a complicated, science-driven statute” for which it
possessed delegated regulatory authority. Pronsolino II, 291 F.3d at 1133. Under Skidmore, a
court defers to an agency’s position if that position is persuasive. See id.
149 Id. at 1133–34 (citing Water Quality Planning and Management, 40 C.F.R. § 130.11(d)(1)
(1973)) (the regulation was renumbered as section 130.2(o)(1) in 1976) (defining a “water
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police” the requirement that states identify waters polluted only by nonpoint
sources until the early 1990s did not convince the court that EPA’s
longstanding interpretation was not entitled to judicial deference.150
After examining the landowner’s argument that TMDLs apply only to
waters polluted by point sources, Judge Berzon found it “considerably
weaker” than EPA’s contention that TMDLs should be established for all
waters not meeting water quality standards. The court found the
landowner’s interpretation to be divorced from the goal of implementing
“any water quality standard applicable to such waters.”151 The court gave a
structural interpretation to the Clean Water Act, noting that section 303(d),
the TMDL provision, is a part of section 303, which also establishes water
quality standards and the states’ “continuing planning process,” both of
which apply equally to point and nonpoint sources.152 Judge Berzon did not
find persuasive the landowner’s argument that sections 208 and 319, which
apply exclusively to nonpoint sources, meant that section 303(d) should be
limited to point sources. As the court noted, the requirements of sections
208 and 319 are qualified, but the requirements of section 303(d) “are
unbending.”153 Moreover, the court was convinced that the statute clearly
required TMDLs to be set for waters not meeting water quality standards
due to both point and nonpoint sources, and that nothing in the statute
indicated that TMDLs were not required for waters impaired only by
nonpoint sources.154 Consequently, the court concluded that EPA’s
interpretation was “not only entirely reasonable but considerably more
convincing” than the landowner’s interpretation.155
quality” segment as a water body not meeting water quality standards regardless of the
pollution source, in juxtaposition to an “effluent limitation” segment, which was a water body
not meeting water quality standards due to point sources). See State Continuing Planning
Process, 38 Fed. Reg. 8034 (1973) (explaining the 1973 regulation).
150 Pronsolino II, 291 F.3d at 1134–35 (noting that the agency’s interpretation was, “at the
very least,” entitled to Skidmore deference). See supra note 131 (explaining the evolution of
EPA’s TMDL regulations).
151 Pronsolino II, 291 F.3d at 1135 (quoting from section 303(d)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. §
1313(d)(1)(A)); see also id. at 1137 (noting that the Ninth Circuit in Dioxin/Organochlorine
Center v. Clark, 57 F.3d 1517, 1528 (1995), upheld EPA’s setting of TMDLs for toxic pollutants,
even though the effluent limitations referenced in section 303(d)(1)(A) did not apply to toxic
pollutants).
152 Id. at 1138. Section 303(a)–(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)–(c), establish the requirements for
water quality standards; section 303(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e), is the continuing planning process
provision, one provision of which—section 303(e)(3)(F)—requires state plans to “account for
the elimination of nonpoint source pollution to the extent necessary to meet [water quality]
standards.” Pronsolino II, 291 F.3d at 1138–39.
153 Pronsolino II, 291 F.3d at 1138 (noting that sections 208 and 319, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1329,
are qualified by the phrases “to the extent feasible” and “to the maximum extent practicable”).
154 Id. at 1139 (observing that the list of impaired waters required by section 303(d)(1)(A), 33
U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A), clearly does not differentiate between the source of the pollution, and
noting that section 303(d)(1)(C) requires setting of TMDLs for waters on the section
303(d)(1)(A) list).
155 Id. The court also rejected the landowner’s argument that establishing TMDLs for waters
impaired only by nonpoint source pollution would impermissibly intrude on the states’
traditional control over land use under the dicta of the Supreme Court in Solid Waste Agency of
N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172–73 (2001). The court noted that
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By ratifying TMDLs for nonpoint sources, the court confirmed a federal
role in the control of nonpoint source pollution. While the federal
government cannot impose regulation directly on nonpoint sources, it is
misleading to suggest—as the Dombeck court did—that the clean water
world consists of federal hegemony over point sources and exclusive state
control over nonpoint sources. In addition to setting TMDLs when states do
not, EPA reviews and approves water quality standards and may promulgate
them for states that do not propose adequate ones.156 EPA also must ensure
states take effective action to achieve compliance with water quality
standards, including implementing TMDLs.157 The dichotomous world the
Dombeck court described, which was central to its conclusion that water
quality certification was inapplicable to nonpoint sources,158 is largely the
product of EPA’s discretion and court decisions like Dombeck. It may be
too much to expect the Ninth Circuit to reconsider its restrictive
interpretation in Dombeck, however fallacious its underlying premise, but
other circuits should take note that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling on the scope of
TMDLs is at war with its ruling on the scope of state water quality
certification.
III. AMERICAN WILDLANDS V. BROWNER: EXEMPTING NONPOINT SOURCES
FROM ANTIDEGRADATION
Like the water quality standards of which it is a part, antidegradation
policy has its roots in the Water Quality Act of 1965.159 Unlike EPA in the
dam-pollution cases discussed in section I, Interior Secretary Stewart
Udall160 interpreted the 1965 statute’s purpose broadly, to authorize the
establishment of a federal antidegradation policy. Secretary Udall thought
that the purpose of “enchanc[ing] the quality and value of our water
resources and . . . establish[ing] a national policy for the prevention,
control, and abatement of water pollution” justified the antidegradation
policy he announced in 1968.161 EPA eventually put the policy into
the Garcia River TMDL leaves implementation issues, such as specifying the exact load of
pollutants from particular parcels of land, to the state, allowing the state to choose whether if
and how to implement the TMDL. Pronsolino II, 291 F.3d at 1140. A state choosing not to
implement a TMDL might risk losing federal funding of its water pollution program. Id.
156 33 U.S.C. §§ 1313(d)(2) (granting EPA’s authority to promulgate federal TMDLs);
1313(b)–(c) (granting EPA’s review and approval of state standards and authority to
promulgate federal standards).
157 Id. § 1313(e)(3)(F) (stating that EPA is to ensure that states achieve compliance with
water quality standards). Presumably, a state that failed to take effective action to meet water
quality standards would be subject to losing federal grant money. See Pronsolino II, 291 F.3d at
1140.
158 See supra notes 120–23 and accompanying text (discussing Dombeck).
159 Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Act];
see Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL Program V: Aftershock and Prelude, 32 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,385, 10,406 (2002).
160 See John Harleston, What is Antidegradation Policy: Does Anyone Know?, 5 S.C. ENVTL.
L.J. 33, 39–41 (1996) (Before EPA was created in 1970, the Interior Department had jurisdiction
over water pollution control.).
161 1965 Act, supra note 159, § 1, to authorize the antidegradation policy he announced in
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regulations in 1975,162 and Congress ratified the policy in the 1987
amendments to the statute.163
EPA’s regulations attempt to ensure that states do not allow their highquality waters to deteriorate to the level of water quality standards. The
regulations do this by affording high-quality waters three kinds of
protection, depending on how the waters are classified. Tier I waters must
provide water quality that protects and maintains existing instream uses.164
Tier II waters are waters that have water quality exceeding that necessary to
support aquatic life and recreation, and may not be degraded unless “a
lower water quality is necessary to accommodate important economic or
social development in the area in which the waters are located.”165 Tier III
waters are “outstanding national resource waters,” where water quality is to
be maintained and protected without exception.166
The key antidegradation regulation concerns Tier II waters because the
protection the regulations offer Tier I waters is quite uncertain,167 and Tier
III’s waters are limited in scope.168 Tier II waters, those high-quality waters,
1968. See Harleston, supra note 160, at 40.
162 Establishment of Water Quality Standards, 40 Fed. Reg. 55,334, 55,341 (Nov. 28, 1975)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. § 130.17(e) (1976). EPA amended the regulations eight years later, making
minor changes to the policy that is still in effect. Water Quality Standards Regulation, 48 Fed.
Reg. 51,405 (Nov. 8, 1983) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (2002)). See Harleston, supra note 160,
at 40–47 (comparing the 1968, 1975, and 1983 versions of antidegradation policy).
163 Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987). The amendments added
section 303(d)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B), which authorizes revision of discharge limits or
water quality standards on high-quality waterbodies only in conformance with the
antidegradation policy. In 1990, Congress again ratified the antidegradation policy in the Great
Lakes Critical Programs Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-596, 104 Stat. 3001 (1990) (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1268(c)(2)(A), (C)). See Harleston, supra note 160, at 47–48; Adler, supra note 11, at
215.
164 Establishment of Water Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(1) (2002).
165 Id. § 131.12(a)(2).
166 Id. § 131.12(a)(3). Outstanding national resource waters include waters in national and
state parks and wildlife refuges and other waters of exceptional recreational or ecological
significance. Id.
167 EPA’s Tier I antidegradation regulations do not quantify the degree of degradation
allowed. They require only that “[e]xisting instream water uses and the level of water quality
necessary to protect the existing uses shall be maintained and protected.” Establishment of
Water Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(1) (2002). However, since the Supreme Court
sustained EPA’s interpretation that point source discharges do not violate state antidegradation
standards absent “actually detectable or measurable changes in water quality” (Arkansas v.
Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 111–13 (1992)), it would seem quite likely that the application of
antidegradation standards to nonpoint sources would also require a detectable change in water
quality.
168 EPA has admitted that “[t]he designation of water bodies as ONRWs [Outstanding
National Resource Waters] has been limited in its application. Overall, there are relatively few
water bodies designated as ONRWs in the United States, although some States have designated
a high percentage of State waters as ONRWs. Several States have been reluctant to adopt
ONRWs because of concerns regarding the process for adopting ONRW classifications and the
level of protection afforded to a water once it is classified as an ONRW.” Water Quality
Standards Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,742, 36,786 (July 7, 1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 131
(2002)). See Judith M. Brawer, Antidegradation Policy and Outstanding National Resource
Waters in the Northern Rocky Mountain States, 20 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 13, 20 (1999)
(noting that there are few waterbodies designated as ONRWs throughout the country).
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that support important aquatic and recreational resources but have not
received “outstanding national resource water” designation, supposedly are
protected against degradation absent a showing by the state of
countervailing economic and social considerations.169 However, the state of
Montana sought to eliminate whatever Tier II protection might provide
against nonpoint source pollution by exempting nonpoint sources from Tier
II review. This exemption required EPA approval in conjunction with EPA’s
review of Montana’s water quality standards. EPA’s approval was challenged
by environmentalists and upheld in American Wildlands v. Browner.170

A. The District Court Decision
Between 1989 and 1998, Montana made a number of changes in its
water quality standards (including exempting nonpoint sources from Tier II
antidegradation limits), none of which drew a response from EPA.
Consequently, a coalition of environmental groups filed suit, challenging
EPA’s inaction.171 The suit finally induced EPA to act, and the agency
approved the state’s changes.172 The environmentalists then amended their
complaint to challenge EPA’s approval of the state’s exemption of nonpoint
sources from Tier II antidegradation review and its exemption of mixing
zones from compliance with the state’s water quality standards.173 We focus
here only on the antidegradation exemption.174

169 EPA regulations require states to determine, after public participation, that allowing
lower water quality is necessary for essential economic or social development in the
geographical area in which the waters are located. 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2) (2002). The state
must obtain EPA approval to allow degradation of water quality. Id.
170 Am. Wildlands v. Browner (Am. Wildlands II), 260 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2001).
171 The suit was filed in the district court of Colorado, the site of EPA’s regional office with
oversight over Montana. Thus, even though the state of Montana is in the Ninth Circuit, the case
was filed in the Tenth Circuit. The environmental plaintiffs were American Wildlands, Pacific
Rivers Council, the Montana Environmental Information Center, and the Northern Plains
Resource Council. Am. Wildlands v. Browner (Am. Wildlands I), 94 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Colo.
2000).
172 Id. at 1155.
173 Id.
174 Mixing zones are small areas of a water body near a discharge point where a pollutant
first enters a water body, and where water quality standards need not be met, because dilution
allows the standard to be met outside the designated mixing zone without impairing the
integrity of the water body or the organisms in it, or posing heath risks. See id. at 1162. The
court sustained the exemption of mixing zones from narrative water quality standards, despite
environmentalists’ claims that the state provided no substantive restrictions on the size, shape,
or location of mixing zones, and gave no assurance that designated uses would be protected,
because the court determined that EPA’s mixing zone criteria were only suggestive and the
state “has made efforts to protect water quality criteria of mixing zones” through its permit
system for point sources. Id. at 1163 (citing state provisions requiring that mixing zones be the
smallest practicable size, have a minimum practicable effect on water uses, and have definable
boundaries). The court also upheld exemption of mixing zones from antidegradation
requirements on the basis of an EPA guidance document, which it considered a more specific
“law” than the antidegradation policy. Id. at 1164.
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After upholding the environmentalists’ standing,175 Judge Kane ruled
that EPA’s decision would be reviewed under the deferential “arbitrary and
capricious” standard of the Administrative Procedure Act.176 He summarized
the positions succinctly: “American Wildlands contends that exempting
nonpoint sources of pollution undermines the objectives of the CWA. EPA
maintains it lacks authority under the CWA to require states to establish
regulatory schemes for nonpoint sources.”177 Judge Kane construed the
Clean Water Act in a manner similar to Judge Schroeder in Dombeck,
asserting that section 319’s failure to impose penalties on nonpoint sources
that violate the “best management practices” called for by that provision
“implies [that] Congress did not intend the CWA to regulate nonpoint source
pollution.”178 The court did not consider whether section 303’s requirement
that states establish (and that EPA establish if states do not) TMDLs for
streams not meeting water quality standards might imply that nonpoint
sources were not immune from regulation.179
In view of the statute’s disparate treatment of point and nonpoint
sources, Judge Kane concluded that “EPA acted within the range of
authority and discretion Congress afforded it” because the agency had
“examined the relevant data and articulated a rational connection between
the facts found and the decision made.”180 Thus, he upheld EPA’s decision to
approve Montana’s exemption of nonpoint source pollution from most
antidegradation review in favor of a system of “education and voluntary
compliance,” two techniques that had previously shown themselves to be
spectacular failures.181
175 Id. at 1155–56. The court cited several affidavits from members of the plaintiff
environmental groups stating that those individuals drink, fish, swim, and use various Montana
waters for agricultural and domestic use as sufficient injury in fact, and it noted that these
injuries could be redressed by an EPA rule for Montana’s waters. Id.
176 Id. at 1157. The court concluded that there was no substantive difference between
“substantial evidence” review and “arbitrary and capricious” review, “since it is impossible to
conceive of a ‘nonarbitrary’ factual judgment supported only by evidence that is not substantial
in the APA sense.” Id. (quoting Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 1560, 1575 (10th
Cir. 1994)).
177 Id. at 1159. The court also noted that “[a]dditionally, EPA argues, because there is no
permit procedure for nonpoint source pollution, it would be unrealistic to regulate nonpoint
source pollution through its antidegradation policy.” Id.
178 Id. at 1160 (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1318 (10th Cir.
1994)).
179 The court did, however, note that EPA’s Water Quality Standards Handbook, which
asserted that water quality standards applied to all waters and all sources of pollution, claimed
that “[i]mplementation may not be possible in all circumstances.” Id. at 1161.
180 Id. at 1161, 1162. The statement in the text is the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of what
agencies must do to satisfy judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard, as set
forth in Olenhouse, 42 F.3d at 1574. Curiously, the court also suggested that the state was due
deference in implementing water quality standards. Am. Wildlands I, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 1161.
181 Am. Wildlands I, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1161 (D. Colo. 2000). On the ineffectiveness of
education and voluntary compliance, see Oliver A. Houck, Clean Water Act Developments,
1999–2000, SE55 ALI-ABA, 107, 109 (Feb. 9, 2000) (explaining that EPA’s use of voluntary
compliance programs to control nonpoint sources allowed nonpoint source pollution to grow
into a national problem); and see Oliver A. Houck, Clean Water Act and Related Regimes, CA 37
ALI-ABA, 295, 298 (Feb. 14, 1996) (noting that voluntary compliance programs to abate
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B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit had little difficulty sustaining Judge Kane’s
decision.182 The court rejected the environmentalists’ argument that EPA’s
approval of state water quality standards should not be given judicial
deference because it involved a purely legal question of whether the
standards satisfied the statute. Instead, the court applied the Chevron
analysis because Congress charged EPA with administering the Clean Water
Act, and the agency exercised that authority in approving Montana’s water
quality standards.183 Because the court concluded that the statute was silent
on the issues of statutory interpretation involved in the case, it reviewed
EPA’s decision only to ensure it was based on a permissible interpretation
of the statute.184 Judge Tacha agreed with Judge Kane that “Congress has
chosen not to give the EPA the authority to regulate nonpoint source
pollution.”185 From this misleading premise, the court reasoned that the
agency’s decision to allow the state to exempt nonpoint source pollution
from antidegradation review was not a misinterpretation of the statute.186
Even though it recognized water quality standards apply to both point and
nonpoint sources, the court determined that the statute did not require
states to regulate nonpoint sources at the antidegradation stage.187 Instead,
the court observed that the TMDL process was the appropriate mechanism
to reduce nonpoint source pollution.188 Although Judge Tacha mentioned in
passing the statutory objective of restoring and maintaining the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters,189 he ignored that
objective in resolving the issue of whether nonpoint source pollution should
be subject to antidegradation policy.
The irony was palpable. The antidegradation policy, the very existence
of which is due to Secretary Udall’s reliance on the statutory purpose, was
undercut in this case by an EPA apparently unconcerned about protecting
high-quality waters from the major source of water pollution in rural areas,
and by two courts that did not take seriously the statutory purpose.
Antidegradation, now largely applicable only to point sources in Montana,
will have no appreciable effect in most of the rural parts of the state.
As in the dam-pollution cases discussed in section I, EPA’s narrow
interpretation of its authority under the Clean Water Act was judicially
nonpoint source pollution have produced little improvement).
182 Am. Wildlands II, 260 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2001).
183 Id. at 1196–97.
184 Id. at 1197.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 1198.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 1198 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 131.13). The Tenth Circuit also upheld EPA’s decision to
allow the state to exempt mixing zones from antidegradation review, noting that mixing zones
are authorized by EPA’s water quality standards regulations. Id. The court thought that mixing
zones were “a practical necessity” and were recognized by other courts, and the court claimed
that the state included measures aimed at ensuring that mixing zones do not damage the water
quality of the whole water body. Id.
189 Id. at 1193.
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sustained. The Tenth Circuit ratified EPA’s position that it had no authority
to disprove the state’s exemption of nonpoint sources from antidegradation
review because it had no authority to regulate nonpoint sources. But the
former does not necessarily follow from the latter. Although the statute
gives EPA no authority to impose controls directly on individual nonpoint
sources, this does not mean EPA has no responsibility for nonpoint source
pollution. The agency has authority to promulgate water quality standards
for states that do not develop satisfactory ones;190 it has authority to
promulgate TMDLs for states that fail to develop satisfactory ones;191 and it
must ensure that state programs achieve water quality standards, including
implementing TMDLs.192 All of these provisions implicate nonpoint source
pollution and make EPA responsible for ensuring nonpoint source pollution
does not undermine the statute’s water quality goals.193 The Tenth Circuit
acknowledged as much in its suggestion that the TMDL program was the
mechanism to curb nonpoint source pollution.194 Unfortunately, because
that program defers any realistic possibility of nonpoint source regulation
until waterbodies become so polluted that they fail to meet water quality
standards, the court’s decision means there is no effective control over
nonpoint source pollution affecting high-quality streams. This result seems
completely inconsistent with the Clean Water Act’s objective of preserving
and restoring the integrity of the nation’s waters.

190

33 U.S.C. § 1313(b) (2000).

191

Id. § 1313(d)(2).
Id. § 1313(e)(3)(F).

192

193 In 2000, EPA finally seemed to acknowledge its central role in ensuring that nonpoint
source pollution does not thwart the goals of the Clean Water Act when it promulgated revised
TMDL regulations. Revisions to Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed.
Reg. 43,588 (2000) (codified at C.F.R. §§ 9, 122–24, 130 (2002)). The rules maintained the
jurisdiction of the TMDL program over nonpoint sources, see supra note 131, but added a
requirement that states establish a schedule that would lead to setting TMDLs on all
waterbodies that required them within ten years, although that time period could be extended
five years. Id. at 43,591. The regulations also required states to provide “reasonable assurance”
that the load allocations of TMDLs will be met. Id.
The regulations proved extremely controversial. The American Farm Bureau and a
number of other challengers filed suits. Those organizations helped convince Congress to
prohibit EPA from implementing the rules before the end of fiscal year 2001, while a National
Academy of Sciences panel studied the TMDL program. The NAS panel concluded in 2001 that
there was sufficient science underpinning the program and made a number of other
recommendations aimed at improving the program, including using biological as well as
chemical and physical criteria to determine water quality. The new Bush Administration
responded to the report first by proposing to delay the effective date of the TMDL regulations
until March 2003, and then withdrawing the regulations in October 2001, claiming it would
reissue them within eighteen months. See Linda A. Malone, The Myths and Truths that Threaten
the TMDL Program, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 11,133, 11,138 (2002) (discussing the
controversy in greater detail and providing documentation); see also Bell, supra note 136, at
72–73 (describing legal attacks on the TMDL program).
194 Am. Wildlands II, 260 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2001).
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IV. CONCLUSION
When President Nixon chartered the Environmental Protection Agency
in July 1970, he commented that “[d]espite its complexity, for pollution
control purposes the environment must be perceived as a single,
interrelated system.”195 Just two years later, in section 102 of the Clean
Water Act, Congress instructed EPA to develop a comprehensive plan for
reducing water pollution throughout the country.196 The Supreme Court has
interpreted the 1972 statute to establish a “comprehensive . . . policy for the
elimination of water pollution.”197 But today, thirty years removed, we have
a badly fragmented system of water pollution control, so sharply divided
between point and nonpoint sources that the Ninth Circuit was convinced
by the federal government that there was no federal regulatory role at all in
nonpoint source control.198
We acknowledge this fragmentation is due in large part to the structure
of the Clean Water Act, but EPA—the agency directed to consider pollution
as a single, interrelated force and to control it in a comprehensive manner—
has failed miserably, as the three principal cases examined in this study
illustrate. In them, EPA 1) ignored the remedial purpose of the statute and
instead employed a narrow, technical interpretation to conclude that dam
pollution was exempt from federal permit requirements;199 2) allowed the
U.S. Forest Service to argue mistakenly that the statute contemplated no
federal role in nonpoint source control and, further, that nonpoint sources
were also exempt from state water-quality certification procedures;200 and 3)
claimed it had no authority to require states to apply antidegradation
requirements to nonpoint sources.201 There is a pattern here that has nothing
to do with clean water and everything to do with administrative and/or
political convenience. It simply has been more convenient for EPA to treat
nonpoint source pollution as only the states’ problem, and then to interpret
broadly the pollution sources it defines as nonpoint, than to confront the
difficulties of overseeing nonpoint source control.202 The courts’ deference

195 President’s Message to Congress Accompanying Reorganization Plans 3 (establishing
EPA) and 4 (establishing the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) (July 9, 1970),
reprinted in 6 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 908 (1970).
196 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2000).
197 Milwaukee v. Illinios, 451 U.S. 304, 318 (1981) (emphasis in original) (quoting S. REP. NO.
92-414, at 95 (1971) reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3669, 3757).
198 See supra notes 119–30 and accompanying text.
199 See supra notes 20–78 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 104–30 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 170–94 and accompanying text.
202 These difficulties are largely political in nature, as neither EPA nor the states have had
the will to confront the pollution produced by farming, timber, and mining operations. See
Malone, supra note 193. Devising effective nonpoint source controls is hardly rocket science, as
Professor Houck has pointed out: “[T]he control technologies for nonpoint source pollution
(e.g., shelter-belts, nutrient caps, retention ponds) are anything but unknown, complex,
technologically difficult, or even very costly.” Houck, supra note 136, at 10,424.
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to EPA amounts to judicial ratification of the agency’s position—despite its
incongruity with the purpose of the Clean Water Act and even the purpose
of EPA itself.
The upshot is that after thirty years the nation’s water pollution control
effort is half-baked. With little or no federal oversight of their nonpoint
source control efforts, the states have showed themselves to be spectacular
failures. In 1999, the General Accounting Office reported that more than
one-third of the nation’s waters fail to meet water quality standards,
principally because of nonpoint source pollution.203 In 1996 alone, poor
water quality—primarily due to nonpoint source pollution—led to more
than 2000 fish advisories and 2500 beach closures.204
EPA has not only largely eschewed a federal regulatory role in
nonpoint source control, but also acquiesced in the Forest Service’s position
that the states may not use their water quality certification procedures to
control federal nonpoint source pollution. So the federal government
continues to spend in excess of $3 billion annually on nonpoint source
control,205 yet widespread water quality standard violations continue
because there is neither effective regulation of, nor investment in, nonpoint
source control on nonfederal lands. Perhaps it is time to redirect some of
that federal money to use existing federal regulatory authorities, such as
overseeing and setting water quality standards and TMDLs, and ensuring
that states take effective measures to meet water quality standards,206 in
order to combat nonpoint source pollution. While awaiting an EPA which
would take seriously its nonpoint source obligations in light of the Clean
Water Act’s objective—a 21st century Secretary Udall, who created the
antidegradation policy by interpreting the statutory objective broadly207
reversing the three principal cases examined in this Article208 would be a

203 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL ROLE IN ADDRESSING—AND CONTRIBUTING TO—
NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION 18 (1999).
204 Id.
205 Id. at 25 (reporting $14 billion in federal spending for fiscal years 1994–98, which has
since increased); id. at 11.
206 See supra notes 156–157 and accompanying text.
207 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
208 We suggest 1) in the Second Circuit, challenging the pollution produced by dam
operations not involving an interbasin water transfer, as in Catskill Mountains—alleging EPA’s
interpretation is, in Judge Green’s words, “overly literal . . . technical . . . tortured . . . counter to
expressed congressional intent . . . [and inconsistent with a proper interpretation of] broadly
remedial legislation” (supra notes 34, 38–39 and accompanying text), and claiming that for
these reasons EPA’s position lacks persuasiveness, especially in light of the agency’s apparently
inconsistent interpretation of the term “addition” in the context of wetland fill (supra note 56
and accompanying text); 2) challenging federal grazing permits or timber sales producing
nonpoint source pollution exceeding state water quality standards for failing to have a section
401 certification in a circuit outside the Ninth Circuit—alleging that the Ninth Circuit (and
EPA) has repudiated the assumption that there is no federal role in nonpoint source pollution,
the assumption underlying its Dombeck decision, in its subsequent Pronsolino decision; and 3)
challenging the next state, outside the Tenth Circuit, seeking to follow Montana’s example and
exempt nonpoint source pollution from antidegradation review—claiming that the Tenth
Circuit, by giving Chevron deference to EPA’s approval, applied the wrong standard of review,
and that the exemption lacks persuasiveness in light of the statutory goal to protect and restore
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start toward producing the kind of comprehensive approach to water
pollution control that both the President and Congress envisioned more
than three decades ago.

the integrity of the nation’s waters. In short, while awaiting the appointment of an EPA
Administrator willing to interpret statutory ambiguities and gaps in light of the Clean Water
Act’s express objective, we advocate judicial revisiting of these “roads not taken.”

